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Abstract Quotation has been much studied in philosophy. Given that quotation al-
lows one to diagonalize out of any grammar, there have been comparatively few
attempts within the linguistic literature to develop an account within a formal lin-
guistic theory. Nonetheless, given the ubiquity of quotation in natural language, lin-
guists need to explicate the formal mechanisms it employs. The central claim of this
paper is that once one assumes a dialogical perspective on language such as pro-
vided by the KoS1 framework, formalized in a rich type theory like Type Theory
with Records (TTR), much of the mystery evaporates. In particular, one can utilize as
denotations for quotative constructions entities that are independently motivated for
dialogue processing—utterance types and locutionary propositions, austinian propo-
sitions about speech events.
Keywords Quotation · Dialogue · Type Theory with Records
1 Introduction
Quotation has been much studied in philosophy (see Cappelen and Lepore (2012);
De Brabanter (2010) for some recent surveys). There have been comparatively few at-
tempts within the linguistic literature to develop an account within a linguistic theory.
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Partee (1973) is a classic paper in this area. More recent proposals include Geurts and
Maier (2005); Potts (2007); Bonami and Godard (2008). This apparent lack of interest
in the phenomenon on the part of linguists might be attributed to the fact that quota-
tion is a means of diagonalization (in the Cantorian sense) out of any grammar—for
any expression e deemed ungrammatical by grammar Γ , one can produce via quota-
tion a well formed string that includes e, hence undermining Γ . Thus, we can quote
something that is ungrammatical in our own language as in (1a) or something that is
in a different language to the one we are speaking (1b) or even something that doesn’t
seem to involve speech sounds that occur in any natural language (1c) or soundsmade
by inanimate objects (1d).
(1) a. Damien, who’s only four years old, said ‘I go’ed to Grandma’s’
b. Pelle, whose native language is Swedish, said ‘Jag har varit hos mormor’
(meaning “I’ve been at Grandma’s”)
c. Morry aimed the toothbrush at David and went ‘[æ˜Pæ˜Pæ˜Pæ˜P]’ (Partee, 1973)
d. The blender went ‘plplplpl’
Linguists might be forgiven if they do not regard it as being part of the job of some-
body writing a formal grammar of English to include everything that can occur be-
tween quotation marks in sentences like those in (1). From a linguistic perspective,
one could easily form the opinion that quotation is on the margins of linguistic data,
something that a formal grammarian could, and possibly should, ignore. In a similar
vein, a wide range of philosophical accounts (e.g. Davidson (1979); Werning (2012),
among many others) assume that what occurs between the quotation marks in the
surface syntax is not part of the sentence in which those quotation marks occur. This,
however, presents challenges for dealing with examples where the form or the content
of the quotation is referred to from outside the quotation as in (2).
(2) a. ‘I talk better English than the both of youse!’ shouted Charles, thereby con-
vincing me that he didn’t. (Partee, 1973, ex. 20)
b. The sign says ‘George Washington slept here’, but I don’t believe he really
did. (Partee, 1973, ex. 26)
c. What he actually said was, ‘It’s clear that you’ve given this problem a great
deal of thought,’ but he meant quite the opposite. (Partee, 1973, ex. 32)
And indeed there is no little amount of evidence that quotation is subject to
general grammatical principles governing word order, ability to be embedded and
psuedo-clefted, and semantic selection (Postal, 2004; Bonami and Godard, 2008).
Moreover, all natural languages seem to have quotation of some kind. Children
use direct quotation from their earliest utterances (Ginzburg andMoradlou, 2013). In-
direct quotation is acquired substantially later, but is nevertheless standardly present
in the adult language.2,3 Given the ubiquity of quotation in natural language, lin-
guists need to explicate the mechanisms it employs. Indeed, one is obligated to do so
2 Everett, 2012 claims that Pirah˜a lacks indirect quotation.
3 We limit our discussion and treatment here to ‘pure’, ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ quotation, putting aside
the recently much discussed ‘mixed’ and ‘scare’ quotation. We believe the account we develop can be
extended to these, but that remains a future project.
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in a way that offers an answer to the question: why, rather than being a heterodox
linguistic process, is in fact quotation so straightforward?
The short answer, we suggest, is that this is because quotation involves entities
and mechanisms utilized ubiquitously during dialogue processing. In slightly more
detail—dialogue processing involves a periodic interaction concerningwhether an ut-
terance has been understood (grounding (Clark, 1996)) and if not the need to engage
in clarification. On one model of this process developed in the KoS framework (see
(Ginzburg, 2012)) this involves assessing the truth of a locutionary proposition—a
proposition constructed from the utterance event and a linguistic sign made available
by grammatical resources available to the dialogue participants—assessing whether
the utterance can be fully characterized or not by the sign and if not inferring a clar-
ification question. On this view, locutionary propositions, of which signs (speech
event types) are fundamental components, are the essential means for representing
utterances in an interlocuter’s view of the context—their dialogue gameboard. We
will propose, in section 4, that signs and locutionary propositions offer simple and
semantically parsimonious denotations for (pure/direct) quotation, thereby directly
tying them to utterance representations used ubiquitously in dialogue.
The central claim of this paper, then, is that once one adopts a semantic perspec-
tive rooted in dialogue and utilizing a rich type theorymany of the recaltricant issues
associated with a semantic account of quotation dissolve. This perspective incorpo-
rates four fundamental assumptions:
1. Language as a system in flux. Cooper and Ranta (2008); Cooper (2012) argue
that natural language grammar should be regarded in terms of a collection of re-
sources that a linguistic agent has available in order to build local (possibly formal
in the sense of Montague, 1974) languages on the fly appropriate to a particular
situation. This is meant to provide a basis for the fact that speakers coordinate
both the form and meaning of their language with their interlocutors (Cooper and
Larsson, 2009; Larsson and Cooper, 2009), a fact which is normally abstracted
away from in formal treatments of grammar but which has attracted a good deal
of attention in the psychological literature on language (e.g. Brennan and Clark,
1996; Healey, 1997; Healey et al, 2007). The constant micro-adjustment of lan-
guage as we talk with others (particularly, but not solely, on the part of children
acquiring the language) is the driving mechanism in linguistic change.
For quotation this means that it is no longer surprising that a speaker should create
an ad hoc language blending resources from different languages or dialects which
the speaker has available and even including non-linguistic resources. Since we
are not in the business of building one monolithic formal grammar for English but
rather explaining what resources a linguistic agent has to have available to con-
struct a local language for a particular purpose, the formal problems associated
with these kinds of quotations do not arise.
2. Linguistic events. In our previous work (most recently Ginzburg, 2012; Cooper,
2012) we take seriously the fact that natural language grammar concerns linguis-
tic events and that this should be reflected in grammatical theory. Our inspiration
for this comes originally from early work in situation semantics (Barwise and
4 Jonathan Ginzburg, Robin Cooper
Perry, 1983) which showed us how to make grammatical sense out of speech act
theory (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969, and, of course, much subsequent literature).
For quotation this means that we analyze direct quotation as referring to a particu-
lar linguistic (speech, reading or writing) event. This situates our approach within
the family of demonstrative theories (de Cornulier, 1978; Clark and Gerrig, 1990).
3. Event types as central to linguistic processing and understanding. On our event
based approach to language it is important that linguistic generalizations and pro-
cedures be expressed not in terms of the events themselves but in terms of types
of events (or situations). This use of event types enables us to express rules which
predict possible future events. It also allows us to characterize certain aspects of
events and underspecify the nature of an event by using a type to which the event
in question belongs but to which other events could also belong. The formalism
we will use for this is Type Theory with Records (Cooper, 2012, TTR) which in-
corporates ideas from situation theory and Martin-Lo¨f Type Theory (Martin-Lo¨f,
1984; Nordstro¨m et al, 1990).
The relevance of this for quotation has to do with the fact that while we are re-
ferring to a previous speech event with a direct quotation we cannot reproduce
that event directly (except perhaps by playing a recording of it, which would not
count as a quotation). The direct quotation of the previous speech event is a new
event which shares a type with the original event. Which type we choose to il-
lustrate with the quotation varies depending on the context and the resources we
have available.
Types of linguistic events also play a role in our analysis of pure quotation.Words
(like pieces of music, Cooper, 2013b) can be thought of as types of events, either
types of utterances or types of written occurrences. Thus when we say that “Anna”
begins with “a” we mean that any written occurrence of the type “Anna” begins
with an instance of the letter “a”, itself a type of written occurrence of a letter.
Alternatively, we mean that any utterance event of the type “Anna” begins with an
event of an utterance of the type which is phoneme /æ/, itself a type of utterance
event.
4. Language as a sign and feature based system. It will be important for our ap-
proach to quotation to adopt the notion of linguistic sign (de Saussure, 1916),
that is a pairing of linguistic form and content. For us the linguistic form will
be an event and we will be interested in types of signs, that is types of form-
content pairs where the form and the content are required to be of certain types.
Our approach to this will be based largely on a type theoretical version of Head-
Driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG, Sag et al, 2003). The adaptation of de
Saussure’s notion of sign in HPSG uses feature structures. We will model feature
structures as record types.
Using such structures gives us a simple minded but powerful notion of similarity
between types where similarity can be construed as sharing some features but
not necessarily all. Such a notion of similarity is central to a theory of quotation.
For example, a quotation in a different language from the original may share
the content of the original but not the form. Furthermore, the content may not
be exactly the content of the original but similar enough for the purposes of the
dialogue. In exploiting the notion of linguistic sign in quotation we are following
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the lead of Bonami and Godard (2008) and also Potts (2007) who essentially uses
a sign-based (though not feature-based) approach although he does not refer to it
explicitly as such.
The rest of the paper is structured as following: Section 2 provides a brief survey
of relevant data and relates them to these four aspects. Section 3 introduces TTR and
show how it enables the modelling of dialogical interaction. Section 4 applies these
tools to develop analyses of pure and direct quotation.
2 Some data
In this section we will present some data on quotation that motivates our account:
on pure quotation it justifies our decision to postulate a sign–denoting construction;
for direct quotation we provide data suggesting that a similarity measure and that
grammatical resources are contextual parameters of such uses; we demonstrate that
direct quotation is selected by certain predicates, raising the issue of what the seman-
tic type of such uses is; finally, we demonstrate the close relationship between direct
and indirect quotation.
2.1 Pure Quotation
Pure quotation involves general, rule–like statements about utterance types. As ex-
ample (3) shows, these can target various dimensions of the linguistic sign, but they
do not directly concern any utterance tokens as such:
(3) a. syntax:
‘Bo’ is a noun
‘Bo left’ is a declarative sentence
b. phonology:
‘Bo’ starts with b
‘Bo left’ consists of two monosyllabic words
c. semantics
‘Bo’ is used to refer to a person named ‘Bo’
‘Bo left’ predicates leaving of a person named ‘Bo’
d. context:
‘Bye’ is used as the final move in a conversation
To capture the data in (3), one needs to assume that quotation has a use in which
it refers to an entity that incorporates information about the variety of linguistic
dimensions (phonological, morphosyntactic, semantic, . . . ) relative to a particular
language—it is crucial, e.g., that neither intra-linguistic, nor cross-linguistic homo-
phones (English ‘rapport’ (relationship) and French ‘rapport’ (report); Hebrew ‘xatuna’
(wedding) and Georgian ‘xatuna’ (a proper name)) be conflated. Hence, breezy as-
sumptions about the pure quotation as ‘denoting the expression’ cannot be main-
tained.4
4 The locus classicus for this view is Quine: ‘Take quotation marks: applied to any sort of expression,
what they produce is a singular term (naming, as it happens, the expression inside).’ Quine (1960). Geurts
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By shifting the content of a proper name to a type of occurrence of a proper name
we can explain apparent failures of compositionality and existential generalization
which have been discussed in the literature such as in (4).
(4) a. Karl was looking for “Mark Twain” in the phone book.
6→ Karl was looking for “Samuel Clemens” in the phone book.
b. “Anne” begins with a vowel.
6→ ∃x “x” begins with a vowel (Werning 2012)
We conceive of the use of quotation marks in written text as a symbolic way of rep-
resenting that the content of the word or phrase within the quotation marks is to be
shifted to such a type. So, for example, if we were to treat proper names following
the classical Montague (1974) treatment as denoting the set of properties of some ob-
ject, the quoted version of the proper name “Anne” could be the set of properties of
the type of strings of phoneme utterances that consist of an utterance whose phono-
logical dimension has the phoneme /æ/ followed by the phoneme /n/. This could be
derived from the sign for Anne by replacing the content of the sign with a noun-phrase
denotation derived from the original sign.
Note that on this conception, while (4b) indeed represents a failure of existential
generalization, if we allow quantification over types and predicates of types in the
way we have suggested the existential generalization in (5) holds.
(5) a. “Anne” begins with a vowel.
b. →∃x x begins with a vowel
The point, of course, of (4b) is that we cannot consider there to be a quotation func-
tion, “.”, which takes the content of an expression a and yields the content of “a”.
Thus in a strict sense quotation is not compositional. (For a recent discussion of com-
positionality and quotation see Pagin and Westersta˚hl, 2010.) In the case where the
quotation refers to a type of utterance event, we might say that “.” is defined not on
the content but on the whole sign, picking out the phonology of the sign as the content
of the quoted phrase. (This is an essential part of the proposal by Potts, 2007.)
2.2 Direct quotation
Unlike pure quotation, direct quotation involves reference to a particular linguistic
event or situation (either a speech act or a textual situation of a given text contain-
ing a particular subtext).5 We consider two contextual parameters that seem crucial
for an account and have not been explicitly considered in previous work—similarity
measures and grammatical resources.
For a start, there is a question of whether quotation involves reference to an event
or, following Clark and Gerrig (1990); Clark (1996), a demonstration of an event. For
and Maier (2005) say: ‘If the quotation is a ‘pure’ one, it denotes a linguistic expression and its semantic
type may differ from that of the quoted expression. For example, in [the example ‘Monosyllabic’ is not
monosyllabic.] quotation maps the semantic type of the adjective ‘monosyllabic’ to that of singular terms,
and the resulting expression denotes the word ‘monosyllabic’.
5 Wewill ignore the possibility that texts can be regarded abstractly as types of physical manifestations,
although we find this plausible.
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an illuminating discussion of this issue see Recanati (2010), Chap. 7. Our discussion
of direct quotation here is closely allied with Recanati’s discussion. We will follow
Recanati in talking of reference in cases of what he calls closed quotation, that is,
when the quoted material plays a grammatical function in an utterance. The speaker
who is quoting a previous linguistic event cannot, of course, reproduce the exact
previous event. It is in the nature of events in general that they happen only once. The
closest we can come to repeating an event is to create a new event which is similar
to the previous one. This is the notion of demonstration introduced by Clark and
Gerrig. The kind of reference that Recanati ascribes to what he calls closed quotation
is achieved by demonstrating the event which is referred to. On our type theoretic
approach there are two ways in which one can analyze similarity between two events.
One way is to say that there is a type which the two linguistic events (that is, the one
being quoted and the demonstration) share. Recanati discusses (6).
(6) . . .And then Greta Garbo said, ‘I want to be alone!’
In demonstrating Garbo’s utterance the speaker produces an utterance which shares
a type with the original utterance being referred to. In terms of a type of sign which
specifies both the form and the content of the utterance we can say that the demon-
stration and the original share a sign type which specifies the phonological form of
the utterance to be of the phonological type represented by “I want to be alone” and
the content type corresponding to Greta Garbo wants to be alone. Note that in or-
der for this to be a quotation of Greta Garbo’s utterance, more is required than that
the two speech events share just any type. After all, there are much more general
types to which both belong such as Event, the type of events or SpeechEvent, the type
of speech events. One cannot be said to be quoting somebody by producing some
random speech event simply because the original and the quotation are both speech
events. The type which the two events share has to be specific enough for it to count
as similarity.
We want to claim that this need for specificity leads us ultimately not to look at
similarity in terms of sharing types but rather to develop similarity measures on types
themselves. Let us consider a non-linguistic example first. Suppose that I want to
demonstrate the way that John Cleese walks in his Minister of Funny Walks sketch.
I am not able to do the walks so they are exactly like those of John Cleese but I
might be able to produce walks of a similar type. There might well be types to which
both Cleese’s performance and my demonstration belong but there is not obviously a
guarantee that these types will be specific enough to count as guaranteeing similarity.
For language, Recanati discusses Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) example (7).
(7) He said ‘We’re going to close early tonight’
which, in Recanati’s words, “can be used to report an utterance in Italian, provided
the Italian sentence had a meaning sufficiently similar to that of the English sentence
‘We’re going to close early tonight’ ”. In terms of signs this means that the phono-
logical form of the sentence does not have to be the same and the content only has to
be “sufficiently similar”. For us the content of a declarative sentence like we’re going
to close early tonight will be defined in terms of a type of situation which could be
described by the sentence. Thus it will be expedient for us to consider similarity mea-
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sures on the types themselves rather than characterizing similarity in terms of shared
types.
A question that arises on this kind of view is whether there is a single similarity
measure which can be used in all cases of quotation. It seems that this is not the case.
The fact that we can quote utterances that were made in a different language, as in
the discussion of (7), suggests that it can be sufficient for the content of the quoting
utterance to be the same. Here there is no requirement that the form of the utterance be
similar to the original utterance. Even if the quotation is in the same language as the
original it normally cleans up disfluencies such as hesitations or mispronunciations
unless these are a relevant part of the demonstration involved in the quotation. This
point is made clearly in the quotation in (8).6
(8) Aucun entretien n’est reproduit tel quel. Le journaliste e´limine les scories du
langage parle´ (ne serait-ce que les ‘euh’ et les ‘ah’), les re´pe´titions, les bouts
de phrase inutiles, et supprime les fautes de franc¸ais, sauf a` vouloir faire e´cho
a` un certain exotisme . . .
No conversation is reproduced as such. The journalist eliminates the debris of
spoken language (and that’s not only the ‘um’s and ‘uh’s), the repetitions, the
of useless phrases. She corrects the grammatical errors, unless she wishes to
convey a certain exoticism
R. Sole´, Le Monde 7/03/2003
However, the requirements on similarity are not so lax in (9) and (10).
(9) a. John said, “gorse is beautiful.”
b. 6→ John said, “furze is beautiful.” (Werning 2012)
(10) A: John said “I left”. B: No he didn’t. He said “I leaved”.
In (9) one imagines that part of the point of the quotation is to show which word
was used and similarly in (10) B’s point is to highlight how John’s original utterance
deviated from the normal past tense for leave. Further examples of different similarity
measures are given in (11).
(11) a. A: I can’t fight back, it’s finished. B: So what you’re saying is ‘I’m a loser’,
right?
b. Jo asked ‘Am I crazy?’ in French.
c. Jean said ‘Je le ferai’ which I think means ‘I will do it’.
6 See also the following from the economist Brad DeLong:
It is conventional–at least in the circles in which I travel–to clean-up transcripts. Raw human
speech looks silly in print. You eliminate the ”ummms” and the ”you knows” and the false starts.
You collapse into one grammatical sentence those times when people start a sentence, go back
and start it again, and then go back and start it again and finally finish it.
The convention is to edit the transcription of what they said into something different–into what
they would have written if they had been not speaking but writing, sentence by sentence and
paragraph by paragraph, and editing as they go.
But this seems to go rather beyond that, so much so as to convey a substantially distorted impres-
sion of how the symposium actually went . . .
http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2013/12/thursday-idiocy-weblogging.html
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d. Jean said ‘Je le ferai’ which I think means that he will do it.
These differences in the similarity measures used in different contexts are not surpris-
ing if the whole linguistic system follows the principle of flux. We would suggest that
it is not the job of a linguistic theory to specify exactly which similarity measures are
used but rather to exhibit a linguistic theory which enables the definition of relevant
similarity measures.
Agents who know a language have grammatical resources which will allow them
to assign grammatical types, such as sign types, to speech events they observe. In
computational terms we can think of the types assigned to a speech event (utterance)
as the result of parsing the utterance. It is these types, not types in general, which
have to be similar between the original event and the quotation event. We assume that
agents have a collection of grammatical resources and that they draw on different
subcollections of these resources on different occasions, depending, for example, on
which language or dialect they are speaking, whether they are speaking about the-
oretical physics or the family outing at the weekend or are involved in a technical
discussion about the offside rule.
In many cases of quotation the resources applied to the original utterance—in
terms of notation, Γ1—will be the same as the resources applied to the quotation
utterance——in terms of notation, Γ2. However, this will not be the case when the
original utterance was in a different language to the quoting utterance. In this case it
may even be that the agent of the quoting utterance does not have access to resources
Γ1 needed to process the original utterance – they may have benefitted from a trans-
lation at the time. Similarly the addressee of the quoting utterance may also not have
access to Γ1. Note also, that Γ2 need not be the same resources that are needed to
process the rest of the sentence Anna said. . . if the actual quotation is in a different
language or dialect. We can switch resources in the middle of a sentence in a similar
way that speakers of more than one language can in code-switching.
The choice of Γ1 and Γ2 has consequences for the kind of similarity measure,
µ , that can be used. When Γ1 = Γ2 we can choose µ to be a strict measure which
requires that the resources assign exactly the same sign type to both the original and
the quoting utterance. But even here we will often want a looser notion of similarity.
For example, a demonstration of an utterance editing out disfluencies we may want
to count as a quotation, at least some of the time. Different choices of synonymous
words may for some purposes count as quotation for others not. µ may be more or
less strict depending on the purposes at hand, an extreme case being (12):
(12) [An article about an orphaned walrus arriving in a new zoo:] During [the
orphan walrus’] first look at a walrus, he was like, ‘What’s that?’ (New York
Times, 22/01/2014)
When Γ1 and Γ2 are resources for different languages the most we can hope for µ
only requires that the contents required by the two sign types are identical. However,
as is well known, identity of content between expressions in two languages can be
too much to hope for. Suppose the original utterance quoted in (13a) had been the
Swedish utterance (13b).
(13) a. Max said ‘Bo departed’.
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b. Bo har a˚kt (“Bo has gone/went (by vehicle)”)
There are three things which could be different about the content of (13b) which
could make it different from the content of the quotation in (13a). Firstly, it is in
the perfect tense. There appear to be cases where a Swedish perfect is appropriately
rendered in English by a simple past, but this is not always true. Secondly, Swedish
like many other languages makes a distinction between travelling by vehicle and
walking. Finally, the verb which serves for leave here has the broader meeting went
and could be used to describe a situation where Bo has arrived. All of these subtle
differences are familiar to anybody who has been involved in translation. This has as
a consequence that µ must say something about similarity of non-identical contents.
Our aim here is not to go into detail characterizing similarity measures that can be
used, but rather to make the point that there cannot be a single similarity measure for
all instances of quotation. The similarity measures, like the grammatical resources
involved, will vary from one quotation event to another.
Finally, we need to allow for the possibility that the types compared by the sim-
ilarity measure µ are not necessarily the types assigned by the resources Γ1 and Γ2
but subtypes of those types. This is to allow for cases where the demonstration in
the quoting event is meant to show a non-linguistic aspect of the original event in
addition to the linguistic type, for example, that the speaker of the original event had
a cold, was drunk or had a particular expression on their face while making the utter-
ance. This information could be added to the grammatical types to form subtypes and
similarity computed between these subtypes. Note that it is important here that we
construe linguistic types as types of events so that we can, for example, not only talk
of types of events which are utterances of the phoneme /æ/ but also types of events
which are utterances of the phoneme /æ/ with a blocked nose. While the blocked nose
may not be “linguistically significant” in the standard sense, it can be significant for
the content of the quotation.
2.3 Quotative Operators
There are a number of words that require direct quotation as their complements. In
English the marker like and the verb go have a certain usage which requires a direct
quotation as in (14a) and (14b) and does not allow an indirect quotation, as exem-
plified in (14c) and (14d). Such constructions do not even require a speech act to be
demonstrated as Partee’s example (1c) shows and also (14e). Such constructions exist
in many, if not all, languages although they tend to be restricted to an informal spoken
register. One might cite French faire and Swedish typ/ba as in (14f).
(14) a. I asked her if she wanted to read my paper and she was like “Are you crazy?”
b. I asked her if she wanted to read my paper and she went “Yuck!”
c. *I asked her if she wanted to read my paper and she was like whether I was
crazy
d. *I asked her if she wanted to read my paper and she went that she didn’t, in
no uncertain terms
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e. I asked her if she wanted to read my paper and she was like [expression of
disgust, slowly shaking head]
f. fo¨rst sa han typ, (“first he said like”)
hej, hur gammal a¨r du ? (“hi, how old are you?”)
sen a¨r du sa˚blond ? (“then, are you so blond?”)
ja ba, nae inte precis, (“I just, no not exactly”)
han typ a¨r du singel ? (“he like, are you single?”)
http://nellierosengren.bloggsida.se/okategoriserad/13
(accessed 6th Dec. 2013)
Given the possibility of non-speech act demonstrations in these examples one might
come to the conclusion that direct quotations simply refer to the demonstration and
lose the content of the original event, if it was a speech act. There is much discussion
in the literature which shows this not to be true, including the examples (2) discussed
by Partee. These examples involve predicates that can combine with direct quotation,
as well as indirect quotation, as in (15). Indeed, there is a clear relationship between
the indirect and direct quotation complements in (15a,b)—both support the inference
(15d):
(15) a. Zohar asked whether she snored.
b. Zohar asked ‘naxarti?’.
c. Zohar asked ‘naxarti?’, a Hebrew sentence often uttered by people who have
just woken up.
d. Zohar asked a question, a question about herself.
The examples in (2) and in (15) indicate that, in one way or another, the com-
plement of a direct quotation behaves as a bona fide semantic entity, giving rise to
nominal and verbal anaphora, as well as to propositional (‘the opposite’) or interrog-
ative inference. These facts seem to hold even of constructions which require a direct
quotation as in (16).
(16) I asked her if she wanted to read my paper and she was like “Are you crazy?”
But I’m not. I’m perfectly sane.
Our earlier claim that language is sign-based and feature-based, will play an im-
portant role in identifying different aspects of an utterance and enabling an utterance
to be a demonstration of a prior utterance while at the same time making available
the normal content of the utterance.
3 A Dialogical Perspective on Semantics
In this section we introduce the tools underlying our view of dialogical perspective
on grammar and semantics. We introduce Type Theory with Records (TTR), which
enables us both to develop a grammatical ontology, a semantic ontology, and a theory
of interaction.
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3.1 Grounding and Clarification Interaction Conditions
In dialogue all words and phrases are, in principle, subject to clarification interaction
(see (Ginzburg and Cooper, 2004; Purver, 2006; Ginzburg, 2012; Cooper, 2013a))
(17) a. A: Most researchers acknowledge that pragmatics is important.
b. B: What do you mean by ‘most’?
c. B: acknowledge?/important?/pragmatics?
d. B: is? Since when?
This is a conventionalized process: as corpus studies have shown, there are a
very small number of possible construals of CRs—as request for confirmation, repe-
tition, intended content resolution (see Purver et al (2001); Rodriguez and Schlangen
(2004)). There are thus in the aftermath of an utterance (and indeed while it is ongo-
ing) two essential branches:
– Grounding: the utterance is understood and signalled as such (Clark, 1996), its
content added to the common ground, uptake occurs.
Clarification Interaction: some aspect of the utterance causes a problem; this
triggers an exchange to repair the problem.
Hence, we need an entity off of which both ‘shared understanding’ update AND
clarification potential (Grounding and Clarification Interaction conditions) can be
read. In order to understand how this can be formalized we turn to sketch the frame-
work that provides the logical underpinnings of KoS, Type Theory with Records
(TTR).
3.2 Developing a semantic and grammatical ontology in Type Theory with Records
(TTR)
An utterance of a proper name like Bo is a sign, that is, it is an event of a certain type
relating a certain kind of utterance to a content. We can think of a sign essentially as a
pair of an event e and a content c. (We will argue later that more things are involved.)
One way of thinking of this pair is as the set {e,c}. This set, however, does not label
its elements in any way. Given an arbitrary sign modelled in this way it may not be
obvious which element is playing which role. For this reason we use records, which
include not only the objects in a set but also labels for those objects. For now, we
will use the labels ‘s-event’ (for “speech event”) and ‘cont’. (for “content”). Each
label can label only one object in a record. Formally, we can model records as sets of
ordered pairs consisting of a label and an object as in (18a). We will represent this as
in (18b) in order to emphasize the relationship with feature structures in linguistics
and to make larger structures more readable.
(18) a. {〈s-event,e〉,〈cont,c〉}
b.
[
s-event = e
cont = c
]
Quotation via Dialogical Interaction 13
Part of what makes TTR a type theory is that each object a belongs to a type T ,
in symbols, a : T . In fact in TTR objects may belong to many types, even infinitely
many types. Thus, for example, we may say that e belongs to the type SEvent (for
“speech event”) and c belongs to the type Cont (for “content”). Types are regarded
as mathematical entities in their own right within the semantic universe. They are not
just collections of objects. ‘:’, the “of-type relation”, represents a relation which holds
between objects and types. This means that types are intensional in the sense that two
distinct types can be related to the same set of objects by the of-type relation. We
also have record types which are labelled sets of types, that is, sets of ordered pairs
of labels and types such that each label in the record type is associated with exactly
one type. The type of signs as we have so far discussed them is thus (19a). As with
records we represent this in the, for linguists, more convenient form (19b).
(19) a. {〈s-event,SEvent〉,〈cont,Cont〉}
b.
[
s-event : SEvent
cont : Cont
]
The of-type relation between records and record types is defined such that a record,
r is of a record type T just in case for each labelled type in T r contains a labelled
object of that type:7
(20) The record

l1 = a1
l2 = a2
. . .
ln = an

 is of type:


l1 : T1
l2 : T2
. . .
ln : Tn


iff a1 : T1,a2 : T2, . . . ,an : Tn
The type SEventmay be considered to be a record type. Its exact nature is a matter
of the analysis you wish to propose. One candidate is (21), although one can argue
that there are speech events which do not belong to this type.
(21)


e-loc : Loc
sp : Ind
au : Ind
e : Phon
cloc : loc(e,e-loc)
csp : speaker(e,sp)
cau : audience(e,au)


This means that a speech event would be modelled as a record of this type, that is,
a record containing a spatial location labelled ‘e-loc’ (“event location”), two indi-
viduals (“speaker” and “audience”) and an utterance event (labelled ‘e’) which is a
phonological event, an event of type Phon(ology). The remaining fields in the type
place constraints on the relations that hold between these objects. Predicates like
‘loc’, ‘speaker’ and ‘audience’ are type constructors. When supplied with arguments
they yield a type (normally a type of situation) which intuitively is to be thought of a
providing a proof of a given fact. Thus, if e is an event and l is a location then loc(e, l)
7 Note that r may contain more objects with labels not mentioned in the type.
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is intuitively to be construed as a type of situation such that any situation of the type
shows that e is located at l. In other words s : loc(e, l) if and only if s constitutes a
proof that the e’s location is l. Before describing what a sign is and how utterances
enter into context, we briefly describe the view of propositions we assume.
Building on a conception articulated 30 years earlier by Austin (Austin (1950)),
Barwise and Etchemendy (1987) developed a theory of propositions in which a propo-
sition is a structured object prop(s,σ), individuated in terms of a situation s and a
situation type σ .
TTR offers a straightforward way for us to model propositions using records. A
proposition is a record of the form in (22a). The type of propositions is the record
type (22b) and their truth can be defined, as in (22c):
(22) a.
[
sit =r0
sit-type=p0
]
b. Prop =
[
sit : Record
sit-type : RecType
]
c. A proposition
[
sit = r0
sit-type = p0
]
is true iff r0 : p0
In (23) we exemplify a sign or utterance event type in the format of the grammat-
ical framework HPSG: this has fields for phon, (syntactic) category, contextual pa-
rameters, and content—the contextual parameters include minimally those discussed
earlier in our explication of the type SEvent above:8
(23)


PHON : is georges here
CAT = V[+fin,+root] : syncat
CONSTITS =
{
is, georges, here, is georges here
}
: set(sign)
C-PARAMS :


spkr: IND
addr: IND
c1 : address(s,a)
s0: SIT
l: LOC
g: IND
c3: Named(g,‘georges’)


CONT = Ask(spkr,addr, ?

sit = s0
sit-type =
[
c : In(l,g)
]

) : IllocProp


8 The convention is that a field
[
ℓ=a:T
]
is used as a convenient notation for
[
ℓ:Ta
]
where Ta is the type
T restricted to a singleton type whose only witness is a. This is why the apparent asymmetry between the
‘phon’ and ‘c-params’ fields on the one hand, and the ‘cat’ and ‘cont’ fields is merely notational.
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3.3 Grounding and Clarification Interaction conditions in KoS
The original conception of Austinian propositions was that s is a situation deicti-
cally indicated by a speaker making an assertion. Ginzburg (2012) extends this idea
to the notion of locutionary propositions to characterize the communicative process,
here the propositions individuated in terms of an utterance event u0 as well as its
grammatical type Tu0 . In terms of an interlocuter’s dialogue gameboard, the issue
can be formulated as follows: what information needs to be associated with Pending,
that component of the dialogue gameboard which keeps track of utterances undergo-
ing integration into the dialogue gameboard, to enable the formulation of grounding
conditions/clarification interaction potential? The requisite information needs to be
such that it enables the original speaker to interpret and recognize the coherence of
the range of possible clarification queries that the original addressee might make.
Ginzburg (2012) offers detailed arguments on this issue, including considerations of
the phonological/syntactic parallelism exhibited between clarification requests and
their antecedents and the existence of clarification requests whose function is to re-
quest repetition of (parts of) an utterance. Taken together with the obvious need for
Pending to include values for the contextual parameters specified by the utterance
type, Ginzburg concludes that the type of Pending combines tokens of the utterance,
its parts, and of the constituents of the content with the utterance type associated
with the utterance. An entity that fits this specification is the locutionary proposition
defined by the utterance. In (24) we exemplify a locutionary proposition, whose ut-
terance type we introduced earlier. The content of the utterance is given by the path
sit.cont:
16 Jonathan Ginzburg, Robin Cooper
(24)


sit =


PHON = izjorjhiya
CAT = V[+fin,+root]
CONSTITS =
{
u1(iz),u2(jorj),
u3(hiya), u4( izjorjhiya)
}
C-PARAMS =


spkr = A
addr = B
s0 = sit1
l = l0
g = g0
c3 = pr1


cont = Ask(A,B, ?

sit = sit1
sit-type =
[
c : In(l0,g0)
]

)


sit-type =


PHON : is georges here
CAT = V[+fin,+root] : syncat
CONSTITS =
{
is, georges, here, is georges here
}
: set(sign)
C-PARAMS :


spkr: IND
addr: IND
c1 : address(s,a)
s0: SIT
l: LOC
g: IND
c3: Named(g,‘georges’)


CONT = Ask(spkr,addr, ?

sit = s0
sit-type =
[
c : In(l,g)
]

) : IllocProp




In the immediate aftermath of a speech event u, Pending gets updated with a
record of type locutionary proposition (LocProp). Here Tu is a grammatical type for
classifying u that emerges during the process of parsing u. Here we identify this
with a sign in the sense of Head Driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG), as we
exemplified above in (23). The relationship between u and Tu—describable in terms
of the proposition pu given in (25a)—can be utilized in providing an analysis of
grounding/CRification conditions, as shown in 25b:
(25) a. pu =
[
sit = u
sit-type = Tu
]
b. Grounding/clarification interaction conditions:
1. Grounding: pu is true: the utterance type fully classifies the utterance to-
ken.
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2. clarification interaction: pu is false, either because Tu is weak (e.g., in-
complete word recognition) or because u is incompletely specified (e.g.,
incomplete contextual resolution—problems with reference resolution or
sense disambiguation).
It is useful to conceive of the integration of an utterance in an information state as
a potentially cyclic process. Instantiation of some, perhaps all, contextual parameters
will occur as soon as an utterance has taken place, assuming Tu is uniquely specified;
if this is not the case, then clarification interaction can occur on that level. Parameter
instantiation can also take place subsequently, as when more information is provided
as a consequence of clarification interaction. Given this, utterance integration can be
broken into three components:9
(26) a. Pending update: in the immediate aftermath of a speech event u, Pending
gets updated with a record of the form
[
sit = u
sit-type = Tu
]
b. Contextual extension: If Tu is uniquely specified, try to instantiate the con-
textual parameters of Tu relative to the context provided by the dialogue game-
board: find a record w that extends u and such that w contains a subrecord of
the c-param anchoring intended by u’s speaker; integrate w intoMaxPending:
MaxPending :=
[
sit = w
sit-type = Tu
]
c. Move update/Pending downdate: if MaxPending is true, update Moves, so
that LatestMove:=MaxPending, downdateMaxPending from Pending.
4 Back to Quotation
The ontology we have developed for dialogue processing can now be utilized for ana-
lyzing the quotation data from earlier sections, with pure quotation denoting signs and
direct quotations denoting locutionary propositions. Quotative predicates select for
clauses restricted to denote either abstract entities simpliciter or locutionary propo-
sitions. We could formulate our formal account in a number of ways. One would
involve type shifting—postulating mappings between utterance types triggered by
quotation. Such an approach is highly consonant with the view of grammar developed
as a dynamic resource available to an agent to create a language on the fly (Cooper
and Ranta (2008); Cooper (2012)). Another possibility, somewhat more conservative
in a way, and in line with Bonami and Godard (2008), is to appeal to one or more quo-
tative constructions. This approach, emphasizing that quotation fits into a traditional
view of grammar, is the format we adopt here, though it would be straightforward to
adopt the former approach.
9 Moves is the component of the dialogue gameboard where grounded utterances are represented.
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4.1 Pure Quotation
The simplest construction we could associate with pure quotation is one in which it
denotes the phonological type of its unquoted correlate, as in (27):
(27) pure-quot-ph =
[
PHON : T.phon
CONT = T.phon : phoncat
]
[
T : Sign
HEAD-DTR : T
]
Note that the pure quotation type from (27) will lose the information about the
original content of the sign. Moreover, we argued in section 2 that, in fact, a pure quo-
tation utterance concerns potentially the entire information about the sign, not merely
its phonological form. This can be easily fixed by using the construction type in (28),
wherein the content of the quoted phrase is the whole sign-type, rather than that in
(27). One additional aspect of this construction concerns its contextual parameters.
We specify that these all get absorbed and the construction, hence, has no contextual
parameters:
(28) pure-quot-ph =

PHON: T.phonC-PARAMS : []
CONT= T : RecType


[
T : Sign
HEAD-DTR : T
]
4.2 Direct Quotation
Recall that we proposed that in dialogue an utterance u0 is represented in an inter-
locutor’s DGB by means of a locutionary proposition, a propositionwhose situational
component is the utterance event u0 and whose type component is a grammatical type
Tu0,Γ0 assigned to the utterance by a given grammatical resource Γ0. Not surprisingly,
our analysis of direct quotation assigns to such clauses as their content a locutionary
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proposition, with the situational component being the (original) utterance event and
the type component a grammatical type Tu0,Γ0 assigned to the utterance by a gram-
matical resource associated with the person reporting the speech.
Whereas with pure quotation we associated solely the grammatical type, we in-
clude here also the utterance event which, in conjunction with the grammatical type,
enables the utterance’s content to be read off, as we explained in section 3.3. This is
key both in capturing the similarity with indirect quotation (see data above examples
(15)) and Partee–inspired data such as examples (2) above. Beyond this, though we
emphasize that by postulating locutionary propositions as the denotations of direct
quotation, we are offering a direct answer to the question we had posed in section 1,
namelyWhy is direct quotation so easy? The answer is that this is because it exploits
mechanisms in place for dialogue processing.10
By analyzing direct quotation complements as denoting locutionary propositions,
which include as a component a sign we can capture simultaneously the type and
token aspects of such complements. Indeed the fact that a single predication can
address both type and token aspects, as in (29):
(29) a. ‘Was I snoring’ was asked by Bill and is a frequently used interrogative
clause.
b. ‘Am I snoring?’ asked Bill, a sentence frequently uttered by men who don’t
think they snore. It is usually answered by ‘You were before you woke up.’
The construction we associate with this type is a fairly minor variant on the one
we posited for pure quotation. The crucial difference is that although the contextual
parameters of the original type have been projected away, a new one is projected to
include the utterance event. To this we need to add constraints that relate the utterance
event and the grammatical type appearing in the construction. As we discussed in
section 2, what we need to enforce is similarity between the original utterance u
and the type T used to quote it—we capture this in terms of a similarity measure µ
and a set of grammatical resources Γ , the relationships between which we explicate
below:11,12
10 Of course there is a bit of a chicken/egg issue here, given that direct quotation is one of the mechanisms
that gets language off the ground.
11 In order to accommodate quotations of non-linguistic events, we would simply need to modify our
characterization of the type of the head daughter as being grammatical to a somewhat wider class of types.
Such types would certainly have a field for phon and might also have a field for cont.
12 An anonymous reviewer for the Journal of Logic, Language, and Information asks whether by invok-
ing similarity measures we are not rendering our proposal to be unfalsifiable. S/he writes ‘Suppose that
John gave a lecture, and somebody asks Peter about the lecture, how it was. Peter: John said: ‘blablabla’.
Can ’blablabla’ stand for the content of John’s lecture? If not, how is it blocked in the model?’ On our
account the truth of Peter’s report requires an utterance of ‘blablabla’ to be similar to the sequence of
utterances that made up John’s lecture, relative to a contextually given similarity measure. A number of
similarity measures we have mentioned above would not accommodate such similarity, e.g., one based
on identity of content and a fortiori on identity of form. In fact, a measure of similarity that would make
Peter’s report true would need to be very coarse grained, essentially one that made all utterances of a given
language similar, as for instance when one hears a lecture in a language one does not understand or when
one wishes to convey that, for all intents and purposes what someone has said is contentless.
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(30) a. direct-quot-ph =


PHON = T.phon : phoncat
CAT = T.cat : syncat
C-PARAMS :


u : Rec
µ : SimilarityMeasure
Γ : set(GrammType)
c1 : Similar(T,u,µ ,Γ )


CONT=
[
sit = u
sit-type = T
]
: LocProp


[
T : GrammType
HEAD-DTR : T
]
We turn to explicate briefly the relationship among the contextual parameters of
a direct quotation:
(31) a. Let Γ be a set of grammatical resources. We will not specify this formally
here. If u is a speech event and Γ a set of grammatical resources we use Γ (u)
to represent the sign type assigned to u by the Γ (ignoring the possibility that
several alternative sign types may be provided for u).
b. A similarity measure on types is a pair of a threshold θ and a binary function
µ0 on types which returns a real number for any pair of types and whose
maximum value is returned for any pair of identical types and for which any
value greater than θ indicates similarity.13
c. If e is a speech event, T a grammatical type, µ a similarity measure and Γ a
set of grammatical resources, the type
Similar(T,u,µ ,Γ )
is non-empty iff there exists a grammatical type T1 such that T1 ⊑Γ1(e1) e : T ,
and µ0(T1,T )≥ θ
4.3 Quotative Predicates
One crucial point the data we discussed earlier establishes is that there are predi-
cates (‘go’, ‘be like’, ‘faire’, ‘typ’) that select only for direct quotation complements.
Another is that there are predicates that select simultaneously for direct and indi-
rect quotation complements, with mutual entailments between corresponding com-
13 Additional axioms need to be met but they need not concern us here.
Quotation via Dialogical Interaction 21
plements (see (15 above).14 We specify direct quotation selection via the semantic
type we postulated for them—LocProp, whereas predicates selecting for both types
will be specified via the abstract entity associated with an utterance of the direct
complement—question (‘ask’), proposition (‘claim’), outcome (‘order’) etc.
We illustrate this with three lexical entries: one for a quotative predicate like ‘be
like’, one for ‘ask’ taking a direct quotation complement, and one for an indirect
quotation complement of ‘ask’. In the two first cases the complement selected is a
locutionary proposition, representing an utterance whose speaker is identical to the
entity associated with the subject of the predicate. The cont value of the predicate is
identified with the value of the utterance component of the locutionary proposition.
For ‘be like’ this can be any kind of illocutionary act,15 whereas for direct ‘ask’
this has to be a query. In the final indirect case of ‘ask’, one simply unifies in the
question–denoting complement daughter and the referent of the subject daughter:
(32) a.


PHON : be like
CAT = v[+fin] : PoS
SPR-DTR : np ∧
[
content = x : Ind
]
COMP-DTR :

CONT= p : LocPropp.sit-type.ctxt-params.spkr = x : IND
i = p.sit.cont : IllocProp


CONT = i : IllocProp


b.


phon : ask
CAT = v[+fin] : PoS
SPR-DTR : np ∧
[
content = x : Ind
]
COMP-DTR :


CONT= p : LocProp
p.sit-type.ctxt-params.spkr = x : IND
q : Question
i = Ask(x,q) : IllocProp


CONT = i : IllocProp


14 And to this one should add, as noted by Bonami and Godard (2008), the existence of predicates
incompatible with direct quotation complements. But we will not attempt to capture this pattern here,
which extends to verbs of cognition—an analogy much emphasized by Recanati.
(i) Bill thought to himself ‘What a guy I am’.
(ii) #Bill knew ‘What a guy I am’. (cf. We all know what an impressive candidate Bo is.)
15 And we could extend this somewhat to allow for speech events like, say, grunts that might not be
illocutionary in a strict sense.
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c.


phon : ask
CAT = v[+fin] : PoS
SPR-DTR : np ∧
[
content = x : Ind
]
COMP-DTR :
[
CONT= q : Question
]
CONT = Ask(x,q) : Prop


5 Previous Formal Grammatical Literature on Quotation
In this section we discuss some recent formal grammatical accounts of quotation
whose insights we draw on.
Bonami andGodard We have alreadymentioned Bonami and Godard’s paper (Bonami
and Godard (2008)) several times. This paper makes several important contributions.
Descriptively, it highlights the canonical nature of quotative complements, thereby
providing arguments for their within–grammar nature; it points out the need for the
grammar to accommodate ‘agrammatical’ quotative complements. Formally, it of-
fers an account for a quotative complement as a sign–denoting construction. And it
points to intrinsic difficulties that standard typed feature structure based grammar,
of which their account is self-consciously one, has with quotation. One fundamental
problem faced by Bonami and Godard’s account involves direct quotation, their in-
tended quarry: whereas a sign–based construction is desirable for dealing with pure
quotation, it cannot work for direct quotation since what one needs there in order to
evaluate similarity is, in addition, the (source) utterance token. But this latter is not
made available in standard typed feature structure based grammar.
Potts In the concluding section of his paper, Potts (2007) writes (a propos of a re-
mark by Bart Geurts) that ‘Quotation is a hugely important matter for linguistic the-
ory. It forces us to enrich our stock of basic entities.’ We agree with the first sentence,
but disagree with the second sentence, albeit recognizing its subjectivity. Potts in-
troduces a standard grammar which he enriches with a type for expressions whose
denotations he identifies with triples of phonological types, syntactic types, and log-
ical expressions. These ad hoc entities are used as denotations for pure quotation.
In contrast, our approach simply reuses entities that are assumed to exist for inde-
pendent reasons, namely signs (utterance types). For dealing with direct quotation
Potts introduces a two dimensional semantics involving the regular denotations and
an additional dimension dubbed the ‘speech report dimension’. Our account of direct
quotation utilizes locutionary propositions, independently introduced as the contex-
tual representation of utterances.
Geurts and Maier The general framework in which Geurts and Maier(GM) work in
is the ‘binding theory’ of presupposition (BTP, see e.g., Geurts (1999)), an offshoot
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of Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp and Reyle (1993)).16 The general inten-
tion is to bring to bear BTP tools to capture the context dependency of a quotation
analogously to anaphoric pronouns, definite noun phrases, and other presupposition-
inducing expressions.
On GM’s account, the semantic effect of quotation is to shift the ordinarymeaning
of an expression α to a new meaning that involves mentioning α . If the quotation is
a ‘pure’ one, it denotes a linguistic expression and its semantic type may differ from
that of the quoted expression. For example, in (33) quotation maps the semantic type
of the adjective ‘monosyllabic’ to that of singular terms, and the resulting expression
denotes the word ‘monosyllabic’:
(33) ‘Monosyllabic’ is not monosyllabic. (GM’s (31))
In other cases, e.g. mixed and direct quotation, the semantic type of the quota-
tion is identical to that of the quoted expression. For example, on the GM analysis,
(34a) denotes the DRS in (34b), with the crucial innovation the postulation of the
discourse referent Q which denotes (or purports to denote) the same kind of object
the word ‘police’ would have denoted. The semantic content expressed by the quo-
tation involves reference to the expression ‘POlice’; it might be, e.g., ‘whatever it is
Tony meant when he used the expression ‘POlice”. In this sense ‘POlice’ is used and
mentioned at the same time: the mentioning becomes part of the expression’s content;
(34) a. Tony says the ‘POlice’ are on their way. (GM’s (42))
b. [y: Tony(y), e: saye(y,[x e’ Q: Ee′ (x,Q,POlice),
z: Q(z), e”: onTheirWaye′′(z)]) ] (GM’s (43))
c. [y: Tony(y), e Q: Ee′ (x,Q,POlice), z: Q(z),
saye(y,[x [e”: onTheirWaye′′(z)]]) ] (GM’s (44))
On GM’s account there are at least two ways in which mixed quotations depend on
the context. A mixed quotation always has a source, which has two coordinates: a
speaker and a speech event. The speaker coordinate may be a concrete individual
or it may be institutional or generic. Similarly, the speech-event coordinate may be
a concrete event or it may be habitual or generic. (34b) illustrates this in that x,e′
are discourse referents that need to be bound via presuppositional binding—in this
case (34c) emerges with x identified with Tony and e′ with the saying event. Hence,
(34a) gets a reading paraphrasable as there is an occasion e on which Tony used
the expression ‘POlice’ to express the property Q, and that on the same occasion
Tony said that the Q are on their way. But for a variety of other cases, discussed by
GM, different binding possibilities emerge, mediated by binding operators such as
quantification, negation, and focus.
In contrast to Potts’ two dimensional account, which GM critique, their own ac-
count is one dimensional and captures elegantly and precisely various interactions
between variable/presupposition binding and quotation, which in a larger study we
would try to integrate into our account.
16 For a more detailed discussion of GM’s approach, also developed in Maier (2007) and subsequently,
see De Brabanter (2010).
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Nonetheless, there are a number of intrinsic shortcomings. For a start, given the
unrelated ways of dealing with pure and direct quotation, it is not clear how copred-
ication cases like (29) can be handled. An additional problem, relating to the frame-
work in which the account is couched concerns selection—there is no obvious way in
DRT and its close variants to specify the type which a direct quotation predicate such
as ‘be like’ selects for.17. Similarly, the account of pure quotation appeals to deno-
tations as expressions, whereas in fact we have argued that the requisite denotations
need to be signs. With respect to direct quotation, given the lack of a rich type theory,
it cannot formulate similarity as a condition relating source and quotation, as we do
here. Nor can the account deal with diagonalization, as we do here by postulating
grammatical resources as contextual parameters.
6 Conclusions
Direct and pure quotation have often been viewed as mysterious, outside the pale
in most formal grammars or requiring unorthodox semantic/logical treatment, de-
spite the fact that direct quotation is typologically universal and ontogenetically prior
to indirect quotation. We have suggested that once one assumes a dialogical per-
spective on language such as provided by KoS, formalized in a rich type theory
like TTR, much of the mystery evaporates. In particular, one can utilize as deno-
tations for quotative constructions entities that are independently motivated for di-
alogue processing—utterance types and locutionary propositions, austinian propo-
sitions about speech events. The “diagonalizing property” of quotation, its ability
to accommodate the unwashed and the alien, viz. ungrammatical and foreign utter-
ances, is unproblematic on a view of language in flux, where there is no overarching
notion of grammar, but recourse is made to multiple grammatical resources, depend-
ing on the purpose and setting. Our account of direct quotation invoking similarity
and grammatical resources as contextual parameters provides the basis for an account
of fluctuating standards of faithfulness between quotative and original utterance.
What we have provided here is of course a sketch: a detailed grammar needs to
be developed and extended to mixed and scare quotation. We hope we have at least
motivated the desirability of a more detailed picture in these terms.
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